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Abstract
We study bilateral bargaining problems with interested third parties, the stakeholders
that enjoy bene…ts upon a bilateral agreement. We explore the strategic implications of
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11 Introduction
In Marcel Pagnol’s movie “La femme du boulanger”1, the baker’s wife runs away with her lover.
But then, the baker bakes bread which his wife sells, so that without her the baker’s enterprise
is worthless. So, the baker goes on strike, sending a clear message to the village: no wife, no
bread. The village goes up in arm, but there is no convincing the baker. The only option left
to the villagers is to go on the hunt for the baker’s wife, and bring her back to return harmony
(and bread) to the French village.
This amusing story captures e¤ectively the fact that con‡ict a¤ecting certain services,
whether publicly or privately provided, do concern, directly or indirectly, the interests of many
parties. Bilateral bargaining in an area of public interest therefore has an impact on third par-
ties, stakeholders, who are interested in the resolution of the con‡ict, yet unable to impose an
agreement upon thecontendingbargainers2. Inthispaperweanalysethee¤ect that stakeholders
have on the bargaining outcome.
The mere fact that the interests a¤ected by the con‡ict extend well beyond the two partici-
pantsiswhat de…nes its “publicinterest”attribute. It is reasonableto assumethat in many cases
the public interest will have much wider consequences than theissue at stake in the bargaining.
For instance, the disruption of essential services like public transport, hospitals, the …re service
and the electricity, gas and water industries has a substantial impact on thepopulation at large.
Correspondingly, the government’s stake in bilateral con‡icts which are of public concern is of
some consequence. That is, one can postulate that the government’s stake can be quanti…ed as
‘greater’ than the issue bargained over. This immediately presents a potential for exploitations
from thetwo contenders: as long as the stakeholderhasmoreto losefrom disagreement, bargain-
ers should succeed in extracting some resources from the stakeholder. Indeed, especially during
the ’70s and the ’80s, Europe was hit by a powerful wave of general strikes in which workers
managed to win (mainly salary) concessions from thegovernment of the day3. The following two
decades have seen an e¤ort of governments across Europe towards a greater a ‡exibilisation of
1See [21], based on [11].
2Note that this feature distinguishes our model from the literature on bargaining with arbitration or mediation,
in which a third party (the mediator) derives no utility from an agreement (e.g. [3], [16], [18], [22] and [27]).
3For instance, in England strikes a¤ected most of the services of public interest, from transport (notably the
dockers strikes in 1972 and 1980), the energy sector (water and gas services), and the National Health service (see
[17]). In Italy industrial disputes touched mainly the transport sector (see e.g. [1]). For an hystorical account of
industrial disputes across Europe in the ’70s and ’80s see [15] and [4].
2employment laws which apply to employment in services ofpublic interest, so as to“harmonise”
it with the private sector4. These changesin the legislation regulating industrial relations, which
in the mains have been directed at weakening the power of tradeunions5, have generally tended
towards a decentralisation of bargaining in the public sector6. The e¤ect has been to transform
what would have been in essence a bilateral relationship into trilateral negotiations between
management and union in the shadow of a possible state intervention7. Consequently, the sheer
possibility that the stakeholder (i.e. the government) may intervene in negotiations creates the
potential for delays, in the hope to pressurise the government into conceding extra resources.
So why wouldn’t the stakeholder with the power to do so change the “rules of the game” to a
more e¢cient negotiating framework8?
These are the type of issues we address in this paper. More precisely, we explore bilateral
bargaining explicitly accounting for the presence of stakeholders. We model such bargaining
problems as non-cooperative games with three players: two players, the bargainers, have the
ability to reach an agreement; the third player, a stakeholder, can only take (limited) actions
that condition the nature of the bilateral bargaining.
We start by looking at the strategic incentives in a simple bargaining model with perfect
and complete information. Our main …nding con…rms our original suspicion that the presence
of a stakeholder generates delays: stakeholders are usually willing to makecontributions to pro-
4For instance in France on the one hand services which were traditionally in the public sector are no longer
publicly provided (e.g. social security services and supplementary pension schemes, which are managed by private
companies). On the other hand in services of public interest which are already privately provided the employment
law is based onto the private employment law. Services which are of public interest but privately provided di¤er
however in some important respect (e.g. they are not subject to collective bargaining).
5See for instance [5], [6] and [7].
6See [8] and [14].
7Canada is another case in point, as conciliators and mediators can be appointed by the government to help
resolve management-union disputes. See [12].
8Note that it is very di¢cult for a stakeholder (i.e. the government) to limit its involvment by committing
to some maximum amount of resources to bestow in order to avert stalemate in negotiations, and then let the
bargainers to “…ght it out”. Besides the potential political cost of adopting this type of stance, it would be a
non credible commitment, as the stakeholder has all of its stake to lose while the two bargainers haggle. Indeed,
in real negotiations this has hardly been the case. For instance even in the UK, were, especially following the
surge to power of Margaret Thatcher in 1979, legislation has been most e¤ective in weakening trade union powers,
the spending limits self-imposed by successive governments have been broken in order to honour previous pay
commitments. A case in point is the Fire service threatened strike of 1980, which was averted by awarding a
18.8% rise, breaking the Conservative Government’s guidlines for the public sector. See [19].
3mote agreement, but this willingness may back…re and become the source of severe ine¢ciency.
However, and more surprisingly, for a wide range of parameter values this outcome is better for
the stakeholder than a situation in which he bargains directly with the union.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. Delays are harmful for all of the agents
involved in negotiations; however, in trilateral negotiations themanagement and the stakeholder
can join forces and secure as a coalition an ex ante expected payo¤ which is greater than what
they would otherwise obtain as a single negotiator in bilateral bargaining with the union.
These results concern the situation where all partiesare perfectly informed about the overall
resources available. In practice, however, negotiators seldom havean accurate assessment of the
means at the stakeholder’s disposal. Thus in thesecond part of the paper we analyse thee¤ects
of uncertainty by building a simple model where bargainers are unsure about the stakeholder’s
stake. Note that besides being more realistic, this type of framework can account for situations
wherethestakeholderis genuinely super partes, or even antagonistic9 to oneor both ofthe other
negotiators. We …nd that, not surprisingly, uncertainty doesnot removeine¢cient (i.e. delayed)
equilibria. However, as long as the stake is not too great, there are also equilibria in which the
two litigants reach an e¢cient agreement with positive probability. This class of equilibria are
driven by the expectation ofthe two bargainers that thestakeholder would not intervene in case
of a stalemate, which makes it worthwhile for the bargainers to get to an agreement quickly.
Consequently, it is optimal for thestakeholderto dither, thereby pressurising thetwo bargainers
into reaching a speedy conclusion.
The general features of thesituation that we model …t many contingencies beyond industrial
relations, and the framework of analysis that we propose is general enough to model stake
holders as “interested’ parties, which may still be genuinely neutral. For example, arbitrating
and mediating e¤orts by neutral third countries to promote peace settlements to end armed
confrontations are possibly motivated by the assessment that more is at stake than the welfare
of the actors directly involved in the con‡ict.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we introduce a benchmark
model where all agents have claims on both the stakeholder and the bargainers surpluses. In
section 3, we build a model of public sector bargaining. Section 4 analyses cases where both
bargainers wish to capture some of the (uncertain) surplus available to the stakeholder. Finally
9This can be the case for instance when the government (the indirect employer) oversees negotiations between
a union and a local government (the direct employer) which is controlled by the opposition party.
4section 5 concludes.
2 Symmetric model - the benchmark
As a prelude to our public sector bargaining model, in this section we introduce a symmetric
natural model forbilateral bargaining in thepresenceofa stakeholder. In this context any of the
agents involved (be it a bargainer or thestakeholder) can make proposals over both the division
ofthesurplus in thebargain and handoutsfrom the stakeholder. The completesymmetry ofthis
setup makes it unsuitable to capture the sort of strategic situation we wish to model. However
it is useful in order to understand the e¤ect of the strategic forces introduced by the presence
of a stakeholder in bilateral bargaining.
Two agents (indexed 1 and 2) bargain over sharing some surplus, normalised to unity. They
can make additional claims from a stakeholder s, who can make available extra resources up
to the amount S. Negotiations proceed over a (potentially in…nite) number of rounds. Each
agent can be randomly selected to make a proposal, with equal probability pi = 1
3, where
i =1;2; s. A proposal consists ofa division of the surplus and a contribution vector of resources
requested from the stakeholder. If both responding agents agree, then negotiations end and the
agreement is implemented. If instead at least one agent rejects the proposal, then negotiations
move to the following round, when again one agent is randomly selected to make a proposal,
and so on. Agents discount utility over time by a factor ±i. Consequently an agreement reached
at time t on surplus vector x = (x1; x2) and contribution vector c = (c1;c2) yields utility
ui(x; c;t) = ±t








Strategies and Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SPE) are de…ned in the standard way. A sta-
tionary strategy pro…le is a time-independent plan ofaction for each i at each subgame in which
i is called to move. Stationary strategy pro…les are fully characterized by a vector specifying
actions and acceptance thresholds (whichever applicable) for each player at each state of the
game10. A Stationary Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SSPE) is a stationary pro…le of strategies
that constitutes an SPE. An Immediate Agreement Equilibrium (IAE) is a SSPE that yields
agreement at t = 0, regardless of which player takes the …rst action. A Delayed Agreement
Equilibrium (DAE) is an SSPE where rejection occurs with positive probability at states of the
game that occur with positive probability.
10The states of the game at t are the (possibly empty) sequences of moves that have occurred in the t’th
bargaining round.
5Our …rst result establishes that there is a stationary equilibrium where agreement is reached
immediately and where the stakeholder releases to the bargainers part, though not all, of his
own resources.
Proposition 1 (IAE) There exist Ss suchthat if S ¸ Ss a family of IAE exists. For all param-
eter con…gurations suchthatan IAE exists the exante equilibrium payo¤ is b Vi =
(1¡±j)(1¡±s)(1+S)
3¡±s(2¡±2)¡±1(2¡±s)¡±2(2¡±1)
for each bargainer i and for the stakeholder b Vs =
(1¡±1)(1¡±2)(1+S)
3¡±s(2¡±2)¡±1(2¡±s)¡±2(2¡±1). Equilibrium strate-
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Proof. Standard. See Appendix.
We now show that there can be no equilibria where agreement is delayed with positive
probability. This is established in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (DAE) There can be no DAE.
Proof. See Appendix.
To understand the above result, note that since we are dealing with stationary strategies,
the only way to obtain delayed agreement is if in equilibrium some agent’s proposal is always
rejected. The consequence is that such an agent looses all the bargaining power deriving from
the possibility of him being …rst mover. On the other hand, all of the agents “pay” the cost of
6a rejection by moving negotiations to the next round. This is however what destroys this as a
possible equilibrium, as the agent whose o¤er is always rejected can “bank” on these costs and
make an o¤er which makes him better o¤ and that responders have an incentive to accept.
Consider …rst a candidate equilibrium where it is the stakeholder’s proposal to be rejected
always. In this case the bargainers can coordinate and extract the stakeholder’s surplus com-
pletely, by insisting on a complete handout each time they make a proposal. The stakeholder
would have no incentiveto refuse such a proposal, as a rejection would trigger either a subgame
where the stakeholder is a proposer, in which case no agreement follows; or one in which one of
the bargainers makes the same o¤er the stakeholder has just rejected.
However, precisely for this reason, the above cannot be an equilibrium, for the stakeholder
hasanincentiveto makeano¤erthat would beaccepted: forinstance, hecouldo¤erimmediately
thesame surplusdivision asa bargainer would do in thenext round, and giveout all ofhisstake
bar a small amount. Similar arguments apply to the candidate equilibrium where a bargainer’s
o¤er is always rejected.
2.0.1 A remark on non-stationary equilibria.
Uniqueness of stationary equilibria does not rule out the existence of other non-stationary equi-
libria 11, and this is the case in the present model, too. However, non-stationary strategies are
often very complex and, especially in order to support delays, punishment are needed which
are often rather extreme, quite unlike what one is more likely to observe in practice12. As an
example, below we provide a non stationary strategy pro…le which (given suitable restrictions
on parameter values) supports an equilibrium with agreement in the second round:
² in the …rst round, each agent rejects all o¤ers yielding less than the ex ante expected
equilibrium payo¤;
² in the second round:
– bargainer i claims 2
3 of the surplus (leaving 1
3 to the opponent, which is accepted)
and ask for no contributions from the stakeholder;










, which are accepted;
11See eg. section 3.13 in [20].
12Complexity arguments can be used to justify stationary strategies in bargaining games. See for instance [25].
7– bargainer i accepts any share ¸ 1
3 (¸ 1
2 ) and any contribution ¸ 0 (¸ 1
6) from
bargainer j (from the stakeholder);
– the stakeholder concedes to any request of a contribution such that c1 +c2 · 1
3
² Deviations are punished by reverting play to the following strategy pro…le: following a
deviation by either thestakeholder or bargainer i, then in the punishment phase bargainer
j proposes xi = 0 and xj = 1, with ci = 0 and cj = 1
3S; bargainer i proposes xi = 0 and
xj =1, with ci = 0 and cj = 1
3S; the stakeholder proposes xi = 0 and xj = 1, with ci =0
and cj =0. Note that in this case ±sVs = 7
9±sS and ±jVj = 1
9±j (9 +2S).
Veri…cation that these strategies constitute an equilibrium is relegated to the appendix.
In the equilibrium exhibited above, agreement is delayed just one period, so that it was
possible to keep the punishment strategies relatively simple. Even so, the equilibrium described
above is far from being straightforward. One appealing feature is that in the punishment pro…le
proposed above, essentially what happens is that the stakeholder and one bargainer coalesce in
order to punish the deviant bargainer. Being the one with more resources, the stakeholder is
absolutely necessary to avoid the deviators from succeeding in “bribing” the other agents. On
the other hand, because of this central rolethe stakeholder manages to retain a great deal of his
stake. But is it necessary to rely on complex strategy pro…les and extreme punishments, seldom
observed in practice, to highlight the incentives that agents may have to collude at the expense
of another agent? Indeed, one may ask the more general question regarding the circumstances
which make it possible and pro…table for two sides to join forces in these negotiations. This is
the focus of the next section.
3 Public Sector Bargaining
In the previous section we presented a completely symmetric model in which (in stationary
strategies) no ine¢ciencies arise: here the stakeholder is a true facilitator, as bargainers manage
to extract part of the stake from him, and agreement is always reached immediately.
However, as thediscussion in the introduction shows, real world negotiations in thepresence
of a stakeholder areseldom completely symmetric, as not all actors have a right to dispose of all
theresources which are the object ofoverall negotiations. For instance, a government can givea
handout to one or both contenders in a management-union wage dispute, but cannot impose a
8wagesettlement to themanagement13. That is, thereis somesort of hierarchical structurewhich
seem to govern negotiations. As we will show, it is this sort of asymmetries that introduce the
potential for ine¢ciencies in negotiations, even in a setup of complete and perfect information.
One could object that since with perfect information bilateral negotiations always ensurean
e¢cient outcome14, there is no reason why a third party, the stakeholder, should get involved.
Yet, the situation at hand may be one such that the stakeholder cannot get away from it, as it
is often the case in services of public interest. More importantly, though, we show below that
the stakeholder may be able to turn any ine¢ciencies to its own advantage.
Consider the following natural model of bilateral bargaining in the presence ofa stakeholder.
Let the management and the union (indexed by m and u, respectively) bargain over sharing
some surplus, normalised to unity. They can make additional claims from the stakeholding
government g, who can makeavailable extra resources up to theamount S. Negotiations, which
proceed over a (potentially in…nite) number of rounds, follow a hierarchic protocol, in the sense
that the union can never approach the government directly, but only after having reached a
tentative agreement with the management on the division of the unitary surplus. On the other
hand, the government can propose a contribution directly to the union, which then has to reach
agreement with the management on the division of theunitary surplus. Finally, themanagement
negotiates with the union only, and any agreement reached when themanagement is an initiator
is …nal.
Speci…cally, each agent is randomly selected to make the …rst o¤er with probability pi,
where i = u; m; g and
P
pi = 1. In what follows we use superscripts to refer to the randomly
selected …rst mover. A proposal by the union (which is selected to make the …rst proposal
with probability pu), consists of a tentative division of the surplus (xu; 1¡xu) and a claim cu
from the government. A proposal by the government (selected as proposer with probability pg)
consists of a contribution cg to the union; if this is accepted, then the management can put
forward a division ofthe (xg; 1¡xg), while a proposal by the management (selected as proposer
13For instance, in 2000 BMW secured a £152m aid package from the British government by threatening to
transfer car production from the UK Rover plant in Longbridge to eastern Europe. In some countries, however,
(e.g. Norway) the government can impose upper bounds on wages (i.e. “wage freezes”). See however footnote 8
above.
14This is the case in the ‘standard’ alternating o¤ers bargaining model. However it is well known that ine¢cient
equilibria can obtain in alternating o¤ers bargaining models even with complete information, once the original
extensive form ([24]) is modi…ed. See for instance [13] and [2].
9with probability pm) consists simply of a surplus division (xm;1 ¡xm) . In other words, with
probability pm the government stays out of negotiations. An agreement is implemented only
when all parties concerned have agreed to it. If instead at least one agent rejects the proposal,
then negotiations move to the following round, when again one agent is randomly selected to
make a proposal, and so on.
Agents discount utility over time by a factor ±i. We let ±u = ±, while both employers in
the public sector share the same discount factor ±g = ±m = °. An agreement reached at time
t on surplus vector x = (xu; 1¡xu) and contribution c yields utility uu(x;c;t) = ±t(xu+c)
to the union, um (x; c; t) = °t(1 ¡xu) to the management and ug(x; c; t) = °t(S ¡c) to the
stakeholding government.
Our …rst result is that an IAE is not guaranteed to exists.
Proposition 3 An IAE exists i¤ S ·
(1¡±)(1¡pu°)
±(1¡°)pu ´S.
Proof. An IAE is fully characterized by a vector of actions (xu;xm;xg; cg; cu) 2 [0; 1]3 £
[0; S]2 where xi, i = u; m; g, is the surplus division proposals in subgames where the initiator is
agent i, and cj, j = u;g, is the contribution proposed by agent j.
Let vi denote the ex-ante equilibrium payo¤ to agent i =u; m;g in a given SSPE and observe
that the following must hold in an IAE:




so that each responding agent obtains the present discounted value of his ex-ante expected
payo¤, that is:. Note that the …rst two equations imply that cg +xg = xm. Furthermore, at an
equilibrium proposals have to be optimal, that is:
xu+cu ¸ ±vu
S ¡cg ¸°vg
1 ¡xg ¸ °vm
Observe, moreover, that the equilibrium payo¤s must solve:
vg =pmS +pg(S ¡cg) +pu(S ¡cu) =
=(1¡pu ¡pg)S+pg(S ¡cg) +pu°vg;
10vm =pm(1¡xm) +pg(1¡xg) +pu(1 ¡xu) =
=(1 ¡pu ¡pg)(1 ¡±vu) +pg(1 ¡±vu+cg) +pu°vm;
and


































Consequently we can determine
xm =±vu =±pu
(S+1)(1¡°)
1¡±+pu(±¡°) = cg +xg (1)
and observing that




1¡±+pu±¡pu° (S +1) (2)





m is positive as long as the denominator is, that is ° <
1¡±(1¡pu)
pu , which is always true as long as
1¡±(1¡pu)
pu ¸ 1.
11Furthermore, it is easy to verify16 that xu +cu < S +1 and that the optimality of proposers’
strategies holds17.
Note that S · S is su¢cient for the existence of an IAE, as we can construct a strategy
pro…le with proposal vectors satisfying equations 1 and 2 which are an equilibrium.
Our next result is that when an IAE fails to exist, there areDAE. In DAE the initial actions
(proposals) of m are rejected.
Proposition 4 For S > Spg =
(1¡°)(1¡±)
(±pu(1¡°)+°pg(1¡±)) there is a continuum of DAE; in all these
this equilibria m’s initial proposals is always rejected.
Proof. Consider a stationary strategy pro…le where in subgames where m is the …rst mover
m’sinitial proposal to theunionis neveraccepted. Onesuchstrategy pro…leisfully characterized
by a vector(xu; xg; cg;cu) 2 [0; S]2£[0; 1]2 wherexi, i = u;m; g, is thesurplusdivision proposals
in subgames where the initiatoris agent i, and cj, j =u;g, isthecontribution proposed by agent
j.
Note that if (xu;xg;cg;cu) are the proposals in a DAE, then the ex-ante expected payo¤s
must solve
vg =pg(S ¡cg)+(1¡pg)°vg , vg =
pg(S¡cg)
1¡°+°pg
vm =pg(1 ¡xg) +(1 ¡pg)°vm , vm =
pg(1¡xg)
1¡°+°pg













1¡±+pu±¡pu° (S+ 1) < S +1 , ¡° (1 ¡pu)(1 ¡ ±) < 0
which holds always.
17For this we need x
u +c
u ¸ ±v
u, which is equivalent to












which is always true.
12Furthermore (cg;cu;xu;xg) must satisfy
cg +xg = ±vu
S ¡cu =°vg
1 ¡xu =°vm
where the last two equations require
cu +xu =S +1¡°(vg+vm)






















1¡°+°pg , vg +vm =
pg(S+1)(1¡±)
(1¡±+±pu)(1¡°)+°pg(1¡±)
Correspondingly we can determine
xg +cg = ±
pu(S+1)(1¡°)
(1¡±+±pu)(1¡°)+°pg(1¡±)
xu+cu = 1+S ¡°(vg +vm) =
(1¡°)(1¡±(1¡pu))
(1¡±+±pu)(1¡°)+°pg(1¡±) (S +1)
Now for (cg; cu; xu;xg) to be a DAE we must ensure that the other optimality conditions hold,




where the last inequality ensures that the management does not have a pro…table deviation.
It is easy to verify18 that the …rst of these inequalities is satis…ed. For the second inequality,
using1 ¡xu =°vm we can re-write the requirement as
S ¡cg+1¡xu ¸°(vg +vm) , xu+cg ·1+S ¡°(vg+vm) =xu +cu
18One can substitute the corresponding equilibrium values in x
u + c
u ¸ ±v
u to verify that this inequality is
satis…ed if 1 ¡ ± ¸ 0, which holds true always.
13requiring simply
cg · cu
so that the government always makes a smaller concession when proposing rather than when
approached by the union. Finally, for the third inequality we can use S ¡cu = °vg to express
it as
1+S ¡±vu¡cu · °(vg+vm)
to obtain









Note that cu < S if19





Hence, provided S >Spg, a DAE is characterised by a vector (cg;cu;xu;xg) with cg;cu 2 [0; S]
and xu;xg 2 [0; 1] such that
cg · cu






19A su¢cient condition for existence of the DEA is that 1 ¡±v
u = 1 ¡±u < 0, that is
1 ¡ ±
pu(S+1)(1¡°)







Note that S1 > Spg, since
S1 ¡Spg = (1 ¡±)°pg
(1¡±)(1¡°)+±pu(1¡°)+°pg(1¡±)
±pu(1¡°)(±pu(1¡°)+°pg(1¡±)) > 0
14The following is now immediate:
Corollary 5 For each S, and pu, there are values ±; ° such that in any SSPE all proposals by




(k +1)(1 ¡pg¡pu)k =
1
pg +pu
It is important to observe that thereis an overlap between therangeof government resources






°(pu(1 ¡°)±(1¡pu) +pg(1¡±)(1¡°pu)) ¸0
which is always true. Consequently, there are parameter values such that multiple stationary
equilibria can coexist. It seems consequential to check the welfare implications of the two class
of equilibria. More precisely, we can compare the ex ante expected payo¤ to the public sector
(management and government) and the union in the two equilibria.
Observe that the ex ante expected equilibrium payo¤ to the public sector is always higher






1¡±+pu±¡pu° (S +1) = (vm +vg)
IAE
is true if
pg(1 ¡± +pu±¡pu°) ¡(1 ¡pu)((1 ¡± +±pu)(1 ¡°) +°pg(1¡±)) <0 ,
¡(1 ¡°)(1 ¡±(1¡pu))(1 ¡pu¡pg) < 0
On the contrary, the ex ante expected payo¤to the union is always greater under DAE than
under IAE, since
(vu)DAE >(vu)IAE






15which is always true. These results are easy to understand by noting that in any DAE there is
never agreement in subgames when the government is not involved. Thus, in any equilibrium
agreement the union anticipates that it is going to obtain some concessions, which pushes up
the ex ante expected equilibrium payo¤. On the other hand, the ex-ante equilibrium expected
payo¤ for the public sector is a¤ected adversely by the fact that the management’s bargaining
power is weakened as the management can only be a responder in equilibrium.
Finally, note that as theprobability that thegovernment makesan o¤er, pg, goes to zero, the
ex-ante expected payo¤s for both sides (public sector and union) converge to the same values
under DAE and IAE, and Spg ! S. If this is the case, though, DAE and IAE cannot coexist.
Furthermore, in this case the expected time of agreement is pushed forward, to 1
pu.
In summary, then, IAEs always make the public sector better o¤ with respect to DAE when
they exist. However, if the stakes available to the government are large enough, immediate
agreement cannot be supported in equilibrium, and delays occur.
3.1 Centralised versus decentralised bargaining
Thediscussion above begs the question of whether it would not be worth it for thepublicsector
to centralise bargaining and act as a single agent at the outset. We now show that in spite of
their ine¢ciency, there may be DAE that are strictly better for g and m than the unique and
e¢cient SPE outcome of a bilateral (i.e. centralised) bargaining game over S +1.
Let us …rst recall the payo¤s that prevail in a bilateral bargaining over S +1.
Remark 6 A bilateral bargaining game between the union and asingle agent p over 1+S ,where
the public sector initiates the bargaining with probability pp at each t has the unique SPE and
yields payo¤s:
vu =
(1 ¡°)(1 ¡pp)(S +1)
1 ¡±pp ¡°(1 ¡pp)
to u and
vp =
(1 ¡±) pp (S +1)
1¡±pp ¡°(1¡pp)
to p
(It is straightforward that these values solve vu = 1
2(S +1 ¡°vp) + ±





A IAE of the game of public sector bargaining yields the public sector a higher payo¤ than
under bilateral bargaining if and only if
(vm +vg) =
(1¡pu)(1¡±)








which can be rearranged as20
(1¡pu) (1 ¡±pp ¡°(1 ¡pp)) > pp (1 ¡± +pu±¡pu°) ,
(1 ¡°)((1 ¡pp) ¡pu) > 0
which holds as long as
pu <(1¡pp)
That is, for separation to be e¤ective under IAE it is su¢cient that the probability that the
union gets to make the…rst o¤erin the decentralised game is lower than in thebargaining game.
In other words, the public sector is better of in the decentralised game as long as its bargaining
power as measured by the cumulative probability that it gets to make a proposal is higher than
under bilateral bargaining21.
A similar type of results obtains under DAE. Equilibria in this class are characterised by
the fact that the management’s o¤er is never accepted in equilibrium. Consequently, the crucial
comparison is now going to be between the probability that the public sector makes an o¤er
in bilateral bargaining and the probability that the government alone makes an o¤er under
decentralised bargaining. Under DAE any equilibrium in this class yields the public sector a











20Note that both denominators are positive.
21For instance, it is easy to verify that if both under IAE and bilateral bargaining each agent can be selected





3° (S +1) ¡
(S+1)(1¡±)
2¡°¡± = (S +1)(1 ¡±)
(1¡°)
(3¡2±¡°)(2¡°¡±) > 0
17Noting that the denominators are both positive it is enough to require
pg(1 ¡±pp ¡°(1 ¡pp)) > ((1¡±+±pu)(1¡°) +°pg(1 ¡±))pp ,
(1 ¡°)(pg(1 ¡±pp) ¡pp(1 ¡±(1 ¡pu))) >0 )





±pgpu · 1 , pg >
pupp
(1¡pp) =pg
Note that the denominator in the expression de…ning ±pgpu is always positive. If pg > pp, then
the numerator is negative, so that the restriction is always satis…ed. If instead pg <pp, ceteris
paribus the public sector is weaker under decentralised bargaining than under bilateral bargain-
ing.. However, provided than the union is su¢ciently patient (which increases its bargaining
power in bilateral negotiations), the ex-ante expected payo¤ for the public sector is higher in
the DAE than in bilateral bargaining.
The above considerations can be summarised in the following proposition:




6= ;; b) for S 2 I both DAE





S > S DAE outcomes yield g and m joint payo¤s greater than p’s payo¤ in the (unique SPE)
bilateral bargaining game over 1+S.
In short, then, although high stakes generate ine¢ciencies in the sense that agreement is
delayed, delays may still be preferred by the public sector to centralised bargaining.
The main conclusions of this section may be summarised as follows:
² Provided the government stakes are not too high, there exist equilibria with immediate
agreement in which the union manages to appropriate part of the resources available;
² if government stakes are not too low, delayed agreement can be supported in equilibria;
² the aggregate ex ante expected surplus is higher for the public sector (government plus
management) in IAE as opposed to DAE; however, IAE may fail to exist. If this is the
case, though:
² the public sector may be better o¤ under DAE as opposed to bilateral bargaining over
(S +1). This is true when the union is su¢ciently patient, in which case under bilateral
negotiations it would manage to appropriate most of the surplus.
184 Uncertainty
Theresults derived in the previous section apply to a situation in which all parties areperfectly
informed about the surplus availablein case ofagreement as well asthe stake. However, in many
situations it is more appropriate to assume that some form of uncertainty is present. In this
section we model the situation where there is uncertainty over both the surplus available in the
bilateral bargaining and the value of the stake. The stake is S¡s, where s is a random variable
uniformly distributed in [0; A]; A > S whose realization is privately known by the stakeholder.
Thebilateral surplusis 1¡b, whereb isa random variableuniformly distributed in[0;B]; B >1:
Only the bargainers observe the realization of b.
Bargainers can reach a bilateral agreement at any t, t =k¢; k =0;2; 4; ::: obtaining a payo¤
1¡b
2 e¡k¢ each, and giving the stakeholder a payo¤ (S ¡s)e¡k¢ ; or they can delay in the hope
that thestakeholder enters and a multilateral negotiation takes place. Thestakeholder can wait
for a bilateral agreement, or she may entermultilateral negotiation at any t =k¢; k =1;3; 5; :::.
Upon entry at t, all private information is revealed and the bargaining game over S +1 ¡b¡s
yields an immediate agreement in which each obtains S+1¡b¡s
3 e¡t .
For simplicity we treat the bargainers as a single player. A strategy of the stakeholder is a
function ts selecting, for each reservation value s 2 [0;A], a date ts(s) to enter into a multilateral
negotiation. A strategy of the bargainers is a function tb selecting, for each reservation value
b 2 [0; B], a bilateral agreement datetb(b). Wesay that player i of type x yields at t i¤ ti(x) =t:
Given a pair ofstrategies
¡
ts; tb¢
; let Ps(t) and Pb(t) denotetheprobabilities that a multilateral
negotiation takes place and respectively, that a bilateral agreement is attained, at a date ¿ ·t.

















´ S +1 ¡s¡bt(s)
3
e¡t; (5a)
where bt(s) =E(bjb(t) < b ·S +1¡s):
We considerthegame in the limit as¢ ! 0, so that tb(b) and ts(b) take values in theinterval
[0; 1], and look for BE in strategies that are continuously di¤erentiable 22 in t.
22This is a mild assumption since it is not hard to show that Lipschitz continuity of the strategies (and thus
19A strategy is type-monotone i¤ ti(x) · ti(x0) for all x < x0, where the inequality is strict
unless ti(x) = 0: Our …rst observation is that BE strategies must be type-monotone.
Lemma 8 BE strategies are type monotone.
Proof. See Appendix.
Observe that when the stakeholder yields the resulting payo¤s depend on the type of both
players; and consequently depend on the strategy pro…le. Since BE pro…les are monotone in
type, over time the relative value of a concession increases for bargainers and decreases for the
stakeholder. This feature distinguishes the present game from more standard models of the war
of attrition in which the payo¤s are stationary.
Given type-monotonicity, a BE strategy pro…le
¡
ts;tb¢
is fully characterized by continuously










Before we characterize equilibrium (s(t);b(t)) at 0 <t <1; ti(x);the following two observa-
tions are obvious but important.
Lemma 9 At any BE strategy pro…le ts(s) = 1 for all s > S and tb(b) = 1 for all b >1.
Lemma 10 At any a BE strategy pro…le, Ps (0)Pb (0) =0:
Lemma 9 simply states that types that can not generate any surplus have a dominant strat-
egy, namely never to yield. Lemma 10 points out that if there is a strictly positive probability
that the opponent will yield at the start of the game, then any type planning to yields at t =0
must bene…t from a deviation in which she waits to see if the opponent does yield.
We are now ready to state our main result for this section.
di¤erentiability almost everywhere) is a necessary condition for BE. See [23] for a proof that di¤erentiability is
necessary for BE in a very related model.
20Proposition 11 The following strategy pro…le
¡
ts¤;tb¤¢
constitutes the unique BE:
ts¤(s) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
0 i¤ s <s(0);
t i¤ s =s(t);
1 i¤ s ¸ S;
tb¤(s) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
0 i¤ b < b(0);
t i¤ b = b(t);
1 i¤ b ¸1;

















Proof. Fix a BE. By Lemmas 9 and 10 there must be types such that ti(x) 2 (0;1) and a
…rst order condition is necessary for these types. Di¤erentiating 4 with respect to t we obtain
…rst order condition for the bargainer of type b(t) :
·

























Similarly, di¤erentiating 5a with respect to t, taking into account that bt(s) =
1+S¡s+b(t)
2 , we





























[(S ¡s(t)) +(1 ¡b(t))]
·












(B ¡b(t))[(S ¡s(t)) +(1¡b(t))]
5(S ¡s(t)) ¡(1 +B ¡2b(t))
(8b)
Hence a BE must be characterized by a solution to the autonomous dynamical system 5b.
Moreover, a relevant solution of 5b must be strictly increasing, by Lemma 8, and by Lemma
10 must have initial condition in the set I =
©




D = f(x;y) 2 (¡²; 1) £(¡²; S),








Notethat any solution of5b such that (s(t); b(t)) = 2 D forsomet, 0 <t <1, cannot characterize
a BE strategy pro…le, either because it is decreasing, in contradiction with Lemma 8 or because
it prescribes that types s >S or b > 1 yield, contradicting Lemma 9. On the other hand, by the
Fundamental Theorem of ordinary di¤erential equations23, a unique solution to 5b goes though
each (x;y) 2 I \ D: And observe moreover that each such solution is strictly increasing, and
approaches the boundary of D: Consider the point (1;a); a = S ¡ B¡1
5 in the boundary of D,
and observe that there is a unique (x; y) 2 I \ D such that the solution to 5b through (x;y)
approaches (1;a). Denote this unique point (¾¤;¯¤) and let (b¤;g¤) denote the unique solution
to 5b with initial condition (¾¤; ¯¤): Observe that and for all t, 0 < t < 1; b¤(t) < 1 and
s¤(t) <a; and limt!1b¤(t) =1;limt!1s¤(t) =a:
We claim that if there is a BE, it must be characterized by (b¤;s¤).




, with initial condition (¾;¯) 2 I \ D; (¾; ¯) 6=





boundary of B at (z; u) 6=(1;a) , then either i) z = 1;u <S; or ii) z < 1, u=S ¡ 1+B
5 + 2z
5 ; or
iii) z < 1;u =S ¡ 1
2 + z




= (z;u) for T < 1;that is, T is the last date
at which any type of either player yields. But this is incompatible with BE behaviour since any
23See Hirsch and Smale [1974] ;page 162.
22type s , s(T) < s < S, such that e ts(s) = 1 according to the alleged strategy, is strictly better
o¤ deviating to t0s(s) = T +¢: In cases ii) and iii) e tb(b) = 1 for b < 1. Along this pro…le, for
each ¼ >0;there is a t¼ <1, such that P
¡e ts(s) <1je ts(s) ¸t¼
¢
· ¼; and for each b <1 there
is a ¼b > 0 such that if P
¡e ts(s) 2 [t; 1)je ts(s) ¸ t
¢













contradicting that e tb(b) = 1 is a best response for any b <1.




for a BE, i.e. that each type indeed maximizes her expected payo¤ given that the opponent
plays the alleged strategy. By Lemma 31a (see Appendix) the …rst order conditions are indeed
su¢cient for a maximum for all types such that t¤b(b) < 1 and t¤s(s) < 1: Observe moreover,
that since for each t < 1 there are types s < a maximizing her payo¤ by t¤s(s) = t; by




is indeed a BE.
The following are now immediate:
Corollary 12 If the maximum stake S is not too large, bargainers reacha bilateral agreement at
t = 0 with positive probability, and if the stakeholder enters a multilateral negotiation it does so
with delay. When the uncertainty about the bilateral bargaining is small (large), B · 3
2 (B > 3
2,
resp.), it is su¢cient that S · 1
2 (S · 1+B
5 , resp.).
The above con…rms the outcome of Proposition 3, in that immediate agreement may be
possible even when there is uncertainty, and actually in this case precisely because of that, and
is supported by the fact that the stakeholder would let the bargainers to “…ght it out” before
intervening. Indeed, the larger the (maximum) surplus bargained over, the less likely it is that
the stakeholder intervenes:
Corollary 13 The probability that the stakeholder with positive stake enters a multilateral ne-






In our analysiswehavefound that as long asthestakesaresu¢ciently highine¢cienciesabound,
in the sense that delayed agreements obtain in equilibrium with positive probability, and overall
23resources are wasted 24. This result may initially lead to conclude that the stakeholder would
be better o¤ by not getting directly entangled into negotiations. However, direct involvement
allows the government to collude with the management and as long as the union is su¢ciently
weak (which in our model corresponds to decreasing the probability pu that theunion makes an
o¤er), the ex-ante payo¤ to the publicsectorin a delayed agreement equilibrium is higherthan if
thestakeholder‘centralised’ negotiations. That is, a weak union may make it worthwhile for the
government to intervene in public sector negotiations: the government can even provide positive
contributions25 and still be better o¤ as compared to a situation of straightforward bilateral
bargaining between the public sector employer and the union (over an aggregate surplus of
S +1).
Furthermore, if confronted with a weak union, the government can hold out in negotiations,
which is consistent with our war of attrition model, and is con…rmed by actual events. For
instance, in the UK the national strike in the …re services in 1977-78 lasted for nine weeks and
ended mostly as it became clear that the government, not directly involved in the negotiations,
would not intervene26.
Our model with uncertainty also provides a rationalefor the introduction ofadvisory bodies
which make salary recommendations to the government as an employer27. In situations were
central government is not a direct employer, in practice the e¤ect of such bodies is to remove a
potentially sympathetic28 management (thedirect employer) from salary negotiationsaltogether.
Moreover, because such bodies havea purely advisory role, as a result the government has total
freedom in itsdecision whetheror not to accept therecommendation. In termsofourframework,
24A case in point is Canada, where strike activity in the public sector is higher than in the private sector. Strike
days lost typpically account for 20-30% of all strike activity, and in1991 they reached a peak of 57%. See [12].
25Although we do not model it, this also brings additional political bene…ts due to a change in voter’s perception
of the dispute.
26The strike was to bring salaries in the …re service in line with those of other energy workers(i.e. gas and water).
Although no salary agreement was reached as a result of the strike, the …re service did obtain an undertaking to
bring pay up to the upper quartile of manual workers earnings by November 1979 and to mantain it at that level
thereafter. See [19].
27For instance, in the UK Pay Review Bodies are committees of experts appointed by the Prime Minister which
make mainly salary recommendations for various categories of workers in the public sector (see e.g [10] and [9]).
In Italy a Commission of nine experts is appointed by the President of the Republic, following indications from
the two legislative Chambers (see [26]).
28A case in point is the UK Fire Service industrial dispute in 1980. A pay increase of 18.8% was reached
when the Labour party gained control of the employer’s side of the National Joint Council under a Conservative
government (see [19]).
24bargainers’ failure to reach an immediate agreement is equivalent to a call for a pay review; the
government’sacceptance ofa recommendation (which“…xes” the random variables) corresponds
to our stakeholder “entering” negotiations29.
Our analysis can therefore provide a rationale for industrial relation legislation across Eu-
ropean nations; however, our conclusions can be extended to more general situations where
bilateral con‡ict has the potential to involve wider interests. Our results seem to suggest that
generally thepresenceofa stakeholderintroduces ine¢ciencies; yet, wherever thereis thepoten-
tial for a coalition of the stakeholder and the one of the bargainers to form, these ine¢ciencies
may be exploited strategically and bene…t the members of thecoalition. Finally, in thepresence
of uncertainty the fact that the stakeholder may delay his involvement supports equilibria were
bargainers agree immediately.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We …rst show that there is a unique stationary equilibrium with immediate agreement, then












denote the surplus division and the contribution vector, respectively, proposed by agent i when
he is selected to make a proposal, where xi
1 +xi
2 = 1 and ci
1 +ci
2 ·S (i = 1; 2;s). Furthermore,
let °i = ci
1 + ci



































i =±iVi, i; j =1; 2
S ¡°i =±sVs
(10)
The above summarises a system of six equations. The …rst line de…nes the optimal proposal in
both subgameswherebargaineri isa responder(eitherto theotherbargainerorthestakeholder),
29In actual fact British Governments have hardly rejected any recommendation from a Pay Review Body.
However, it is pretty common to either implement only a subset of the recommendations (which may cover a
number of other issues additional to salaries) or just delay taking any decision. This delaying tactics is in e¤ect
tantamount to rejecting the reccommendations, although it carries less political stigma than a straight rejection
- a feature which our model allows for. See [5].
25whereasthesecondlinede…nestheoptimal contributionsinboth subgameswherethestakeholder
is a responder (to either one of the bargainers).









S ¡°1 =S ¡°2 (11b)










































































(3 ¡2±s)° ¡3(1 ¡±s)S
±s
(11d)
Recalling the e¢ciency requirement xi
1 +xi


























































i. Then, because of the
e¢ciency requirement xs
i +xs





















26Substituting the values for 11e in the last expression and coupling this with 11d we can solve


















1 ¡°s = 1


















2 = b x2
2








Note that b °s ¡b ° < 0, so that the contribution that the stakeholder concedes when he is a
proposer is less than the contribution he concedes when responding to a bargainer, since
b °s ¡b ° =
¡3(1¡±s)(1¡±1)(1¡±2) ¡3(1 ¡±1 ¡±2 +±1±2)S ¡±s (±1 +±2 ¡2±1±2)S
3¡±s (2¡±2) ¡±1(2 ¡±s)¡±2 (2¡±1)
< 0
Furthermore, b °s; b ° <S, so that the bargainers do not manage to extract the whole surplus
from the stakeholder. Note also that we need b °s; b ° ¸ 0. Since the denominator in the above












±S (1¡±1 ¡±2 +±1±2)
(1 ¡±S)(3¡2±2 ¡2±1 +±1±2)
S
30The denominator is monotonically decreasing in the discount factors: let D(±1;±2; ±S)3 ¡ ±s(2 ¡±2) ¡
±1 (2 ¡±s) ¡ ±2 (2 ¡±1). Then
@(D(±1;±2;±S))
@±i = ±j ¡ 2 + ±k < 0, where i;j;k = 1;2;S. So, the smallest value
is for ±i ! 1 for all i, which the denominator tends to 0. Thus we only need to ensure that the numerator in the
expressions for b ° and c °S is positive, which yields the expressions in the text.
27if and only if
(3¡2±S)(1 ¡±1)(1 ¡±2)(3¡2±2 ¡2±1 +±1±2) ¸±S (1¡±1 ¡±2 +±1±2)(±1 +±2 ¡2±1±2)
that is if and only if
3(1 ¡±2)(1¡±1)(3 +±1 (±2 ¡2) +±S±1 ¡2±2 +±S (±2 ¡2)) ¸ 0
where the last inequality is always satis…ed.
Above we have derived the equilibrium shares when the two bargainers are proposers. The

















3 ¡±s (2¡±2) ¡±1 (2¡±s) ¡±2 (2 ¡±1)
(1 +S) = b xs
i +cs
i =¼Ri
Notethat the equilibrium payo¤of a proposing bargaineris thesame for both, asis therespond-












Finally, we have to ensure that equilibrium shares are feasible, that is b xi








Together with the requirement cs
i +cs
i = b °s, the above establishes a family of equilibrium o¤ers.
It is then straightforward to verify that the strategies in the statement of Proposition 1 are
indeed an equilibrium.
Note that to compute the stationary equilibrium shares in trilateral bargaining over 1 +S













































i > b xi
i:
6.2 Proof of Proposition 2.
As before, let Vi denote the expected payo¤ to bargainer i. We will show that it is not possible
to construct an equilibrium in which an agent’s proposal is (always) rejected.
Consider …rst an equilibrium in which the stakeholder’s proposal is always rejected. Then,
considering that with probability 1
3 the stakeholder is chosen as a proposer - and his proposal









































are bargainer i’s payo¤s when proposing and when re-










, Vs = (S¡°i)+(S¡°j)
3¡±s


























The last equation implies °1 = °2 = ° = S, so that the bargainers manage to appropriate the





























29For the above equilibrium to be supported the stakeholder must have no incentive to deviate





3¡±2 ·0 =±sVs , 33¡2±2¡2±1+±1±2
(3¡±1)(3¡±2) · 0
which is never true.
Let usnow try to construct an equilibrium in which bargainer1’s proposal isalways rejected.












































3 (S ¡°s) , Vs = (S¡°2)+(S¡°s)
3¡±s


































































































30Now for the above to be part of an equilibrium it must be that bargainer 1 has no incentive to
deviate and pro…t from an o¤er which would be accepted, so that we require that




which can never hold, even if ±s < ±1, given that °s · S. Thus, bargainer 1 would indeed have
a pro…table deviation. Consequently, no stationary equilibria with positive probability of delay
exists.
6.3 Check of non-stationary equilibrium
To see that these strategies constitute an equilibrium, note that the corresponding ex-ante


















9, i =1; 2
Vs = 1









We do not have to worry about the optimality of the responders’ strategies, as deviations would
be punished by forcing the deviator down in the following round to either 0 (if a bargainer) or31
7
9±sS (if the stakeholder), so that they are not pro…table. However, we have to ensure that no
proposer has a pro…table deviant o¤er which is in the interest of the responders to accept.
Any deviating proposal in the …rst round by bargainer i would be accepted by bargainer j
if it yielded him a payo¤ in excess of ±jVj = ±j
5
9, leaving bargainer i with 1¡ 5
9±j < ±iVi = ±i
5
9
if ±i and ±j are su¢ciently high, that is if ±i +±j > 9
5. So, for su¢ciently large values of the
discount factors, a deviant proposal by bargainer i would be pro…table only if i can obtain some
positive contribution from the stakeholder, so that 1 ¡ 5
9±j +ci > ±i
5
9. On the other hand, for
such a deviation to be successful, it must be pro…table for the stakeholder to concede to such a













but as long as S < 1
9
(5(±i+±j)¡9¡±s)
(1¡±s) =S this interval is empty32.
31It is easy to verify thatprovided that S is su¢ciently large, the expected ex ante payo¤ in punishment is





















for deviations in the
second round, at the time of agreement, which holds as long as S ¸ 3
2.
32Note that if ±s is su¢ciently large this is a very mild requirement.
31Consider now deviations by the stakeholder in the …rst round. For a deviation to be prof-
itable the contribution vector c o¤ered to the bargainers (in order to bribe them into agreeing







. Also, in order for the stakeholder’s






j >(±i +±j) 5
9.
These inequalities can be rearranges as 21 , so that as long as S < S there are no pro…table
deviations for the stakeholder in the …rst round.
Considernow deviations at thetime ofagreement (second round). Recall that deviationsare
punished by reverting play in the following round to one in which the deviating agent receives
either 0 (if a bargainer) or 7
9±sS (if the stakeholder), and is always smaller than the equilibrium
payo¤, regardless of the identity of the proposer. Consequently, it is never pro…table to deviate.
Finally, observethat it isoptimal to punish forthepunishers, since failing to do so makesa failed
punisher himself a deviator, which in turn calls for his own punishment, and correspondingly a
smaller payo¤ than the equilibrium one. More precisely, consider …rst the case bargainer i has
deviated, thereby triggering his punishment, and suppose that the same bargainer i is selected
to make a proposal. Why is it optimal for him to propose xi =0 and xj = 1? Surely he could
try and bribe his opponents into agreement. However, he would have to o¤er the stakeholder
at least 7
9±sS, thereby deviating to c0
j = 1
9S(9¡7±s); furthermore, he would have to ensure
that the deviant o¤er x0
j is such that x0
j +c0
j ¸ 1
9±j (9+2S), that is he would have to o¤er at
least x0
j = 1
9±j (9+2S) ¡ 1
9S (9 ¡7±s) = 1
9 (9±j ¡(9¡2±j ¡7±s)S) > 1 if ±s >
9(1¡±j)+9S¡2±jS
7S ,
which holds for su¢ciently high values of S, so that no bribe is possible or pro…table. Finally
observe that it is optimal for the stakeholder to concede in the punishment phase as long as
2
3S > 7
9±sS , ±s < 6
7.
6.4 Proof of Lemma 8
The result is proved for the bargainers, a similar argument holds for the stakeholder.










































which is equivalent to t0 <t.
Lemma 14 Given that s / b plays ts¤/ tb¤, for all b¤(0) < b(t) < 1 /s¤(0) < s(t) < S; the
derivative of the expected gains is strictly decreasing at t:










and thus the second derivativeis of the form Ve¡t+e¡tdV
dt : Since V(t) = 0 at thesingular point,
it is su¢cient to check that dV
dt is negative. Writing V(t) as
V(t) =Z(t)s0 ¡(A ¡s(t))(1 ¡b)
the desired condition is
dW(t)
dt
=s00Z +Z0s0 +s0(1¡b) <0
or equivalently that
s00 <
(A ¡s)(1¡b)(Z0 +(1 ¡b))
Z2 (31a)
where we have substituted s0 =
(A¡s)(1¡b)
Z :




33and thus 31a is equivalent to
¡s0(1¡b)Z ¡Z0(A ¡s)(1¡b)
Z2 <
(A ¡s)(1 ¡b)(Z0 +(1¡b))
Z2 ;
that can be simpli…ed to
¡
(A ¡s) (1 ¡b)Z
Z
<2(A ¡s)Z0 +(1 ¡b):
Substituting Z0 =¡2
3s0; we obtain




and substituting for s0,
























2(S ¡s) ¡(1 ¡b)
<1 +A ¡s;
which always holds since the LHS is increasing in s; the RHS decreases in s, and that the
inequality holds at s =S.
i) Second order condition for the Stakeholder:














[(S ¡s) +(1 ¡b(t))] :
We write






34and thus the desired condition is that
b00 ·



























V 0(U ¡V) ¡(U0 ¡V 0)V
(U ¡V)
2 =




























VU ¡V 2 ¡BU +2BV +bU ¡2bV
(U ¡V)
< (¡B +b)





VU ¡V 2 ¡BU +2BV +bU ¡2bV
U ¡V
>
BU ¡bU +BV ¡bV +VU ¡V2
U
;




(V +U)(B ¡b) ¡V(V ¡U)
U
:






and this inequality always holds.
35References
[1] Bordogna, L. (1994) Pluralismo senza mercato, Franco Angeli, Milano.
[2] Busch, Lutz-Alexander, and Quan Wen (1995) “Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model”,
Econometrica, n. 63, pp.545-565.
[3] Compte, Olivier and Philippe Jehiel (1995), “On the Role of Arbitration in Negotiations”,
mimeo, C.E.R.A.S.-E.N.P.C.
[4] Edwards, P. K. and Richard Hyman (1994)“Strikes and industrial con‡ict: peace in Eu-
rope”, in Richard Hyman and Anthony Ferner, eds. New Frontiers in European Industrial
Relations, Blackwell, Oxford.
[5] Elgar, Jane and Bob Simpson (1993) “The impact of the law on industrial disputes in the
1980s”, in David Metcalfe and Simon Milner, eds., New perspectives in industrial disputes,
Routledge, London.
[6] European Commission (1999) The regulation of working conditions in the member states
of the European Union, Employment and social a¤airs series, Directorate-General for Em-
ployment, Industrial Relations and Social A¤airs.
[7] European Commission (1999) Transformation of labour and the future of labour law in
Europe - Final report, Employment and social a¤airs series, Directorate-General for Em-
ployment, Industrial Relations and Social A¤airs.
[8] Ferner, Anthony and Richard Hyman, eds. (1992) Industrial relations in the new Europe,
Blackwell, Oxford.
[9] Flynn, Norman (1996) “United Kingdom”, in Norman Flynn and FranzStrehl, eds., Public
sector management in Europe, Prentice Hall, Hertfordshire.
[10] Fredman, Sandra and Gillian S. Morris (1989) The State as Employer: Labour Law in the
Public Service, Mansell Publishing, London.
[11] Giono, Jean (1972) “Jean le Bleu”, in Oeuvres Romanesques completes, vol. II, Editions
Gallinard.
36[12] Gunderson, Morley, Douglas Hyatt and Allen Ponak (2001) “Strikes and Dispute Resolu-
tion”, in M. Gunderson, A. Ponak and D. Taras (eds.) Union-Management Relations in
Canada, Don Mills: Pearson, pp. 314-358.
[13] Haller, Hans and Steinar Holder (1990) “A Letter to the Editor on Wage Bargaining”,
Journal of Economic Theory, n. 52, pp. 232-236.
[14] Hyman, Richard and Anthony Ferner, eds. (1994) New Frontiers in European Industrial
Relations, Blackwell, Oxford.
[15] Industrial Democracy in Europe (IDE) International Research Group (1981) European In-
dustrial Relations, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
[16] Jarque, Xavier, Clara Ponsatí and JószefSákovics (2001) “Mediation: Incomplete informa-
tion bargaining with …ltered communication”, mimeo, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona,
Institut d’Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) and University of Edinburgh.
[17] Kahn, Peggy, Norman Lewis, Rowland Livock and Paul Wiles (1983) Picketing, Routledge
and Kegan Paul, London.
[18] Manzini, Paola and Marco Mariotti (2001) “Perfect Equilibria in a Model of Bargaining
with Arbitration”, Games and Economic Behavior, n. 37, pp. 170-195.
[19] Morris, Gillian S.(1986) Strikes in essential services, Mansell Publishing, London and New
York.
[20] Osborne, Martin J. and Ariel Rubinstein (1990) Bargaining and Markets, Academic Press,
San Diego.
[21] Pagnol, Marcel (1974) “La femme du boulanger”, Editions Pastorelly (movie realised in
1938)
[22] Ponsatí, Clara (2001) “Economic Diplomacy”, mimeo, University of Toronto.
[23] Ponsatí, Clara and Jószef Sákovics (1995) “The war of attrition with incomplete informa-
tion”, Mathematical Social Sciences, n.29, p.239-254.
[24] Rubinstein, Ariel (1982) “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model”, Econometrica, n.
50, p.97-109.
37[25] Sabourian, Hamid, and Kalyan Chatterjee. (2000),“Complexity and Multi-Person Bargain-
ing” Econometrica, vol.68, p. 1491-1510.
[26] Sciarra, Silvana (1998) “Labour Law - a bridge between public services and citizenship
rights”, in Mark Freedland and Silvana Sciarra eds., Public services and citizenship in
European law, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
[27] Wilson, Charles (2000), “Mediation and the Nash Bargaining Solution”, mimeo, New York
University, November.
38